BIG DATA ANALYTICS FOR FINANCIAL FRAUDS DETECTION by Bellini, Francesco
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
MCIS 2014 Proceedings Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems(MCIS)
Summer 9-4-2014
BIG DATA ANALYTICS FOR FINANCIAL
FRAUDS DETECTION
Francesco Bellini
University La Sapienza, francesco.bellini@uniroma1.it
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/mcis2014
This material is brought to you by the Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems (MCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been
accepted for inclusion in MCIS 2014 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Bellini, Francesco, "BIG DATA ANALYTICS FOR FINANCIAL FRAUDS DETECTION" in Mola, L., Carugati, A,. Kokkinaki, A.,
Pouloudi, N., (eds) (2014) Proceedings of the 8th Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems, Verona, Italy, September 03-05. CD-
ROM. ISBN: 978-88-6787-273-2.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/mcis2014/21
  
 
Eighth Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems, Verona 2014                                        1 
 
 
BIG DATA ANALYTICS FOR FINANCIAL FRAUDS 
DETECTION 
 Research in Progress  
Bellini, Francesco, University La Sapienza – Dept. of Management/Eurokleis s.r.l., Roma, IT, 
francesco.bellini@uniroma1.it/francesco.bellini@eurokleis.com 
Abstract 
Criminals and criminal organizations often make use of companies and other corporate entities to 
hide their identity, conceal illicit flows of money, launder funds, finance terrorist organizations, evade 
taxes, create and hide slash funds, commit bribery, corruption, accounting frauds and other financial 
crimes. These legal entities are frequently organized into complex ownership schemes set up in 
different countries, and with a “Chinese boxes” structure, in order to make it harder to determine who 
ultimately controls them and benefits of the illegal conduct.  
Currently there are a lot of competitors in the market of Financial Fraud Detection but the software 
that they propose are mainly oriented to supervise and manage the institutions’ internal compliance  
processes such as the management and transmission of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) instead of 
providing intelligence tools for proactively discovery potential threats and identify the final 
beneficiaries of illegal operations. Consequently there is a potential for Financial Fraud Detection 
focused on the on-line, real-time statistical analysis of transactions, operators behaviour, price 
movements and the use of data mining algorithms that work on heterogeneous sources of big data. 
After having described the schemes used for executing the three most relevant financial frauds this 
research proposes a novel approach for the detection of illicit behaviours and suspect transactions. 
The approach benefits of a multidisciplinary approach for the analysis of the big data streams coming 
heterogeneous sources such as TV stream, social media and public (official and unofficial) data bases. 
Keywords: financial frauds, big data, business intelligence, real-time analytics. 
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1 Introduction to financial frauds and Chinese boxes 
The well known Chinese boxes scheme mentioned is common to at least three of the most relevant 
crimes related to financial activities: 
 Market abuse includes the insider trading (average insider purchases are more than $56 
million a day, or nearly $1.2 billion a month; average insider sales: more than $600 million a 
day, or nearly $13 billion a month – US SEC), the market manipulation that can be defined as 
distorting the price-setting mechanism of financial instruments (trade-based manipulation) or 
as disseminating false or misleading information (information-based manipulation). Such a 
‘broad’ understanding of market abuse has been adopted by the legal system of the European 
Union. Technological innovations and significant changes to the structure of the European 
market landscape have contributed to a rapidly increasing presence of High Frequency 
Trading (HFT) that, on one hand,  optimally executing certain complex trading strategies but, 
on the other hand, presents opportunities for abuse and market manipulation.  There are many 
market abuse schemes ( i.e. pools, churning, stock bashing, pump and dump, bear ride etc.) 
that can be monitored and stylized in order to train the detection engine.  
 
 Tax fraud is a huge source of public imbalances: VAT evasion 106 billion + 94 other taxes in 
EU 27 (out of 700 billion/year) needed to face the crisis up to 2020). Value Added Tax (VAT) 
has a key strength: the government effectively collects a proportion of the tax at each stage in 
the sales chain, rather than concentrating the potential revenue, and the risk of evasion, in the 
final seller. This “fractionated” nature is also VAT’s principal weakness: many more 
transactions have to be logged and reported by traders, raising both the regulatory burden and 
the difficulty of monitoring compliance. In addition, the seller of an item is collecting the tax 
on behalf of the revenue authority, rather than the revenue authority collecting it directly from 
the taxpayer.  An example of carousel fraud is shown in the following figure 
 
 
Figure 1. VAT carousel fraud - Source: International VAT Association (2007). 
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A German missing trader (B) buys goods from a French company (A) without VAT  
(destination principle) and sells them at a VAT-inclusive price to (C), without remitting the 
tax to  the authorities. After several transactions, the same goods are exported to (A) and the 
carousel starts again. At each turn, the German broker (E) claims back the input VAT paid 
(€180,500). The net loss for the German government is €171,000 (VAT collected by (B) and 
not remitted to the authorities). This is the basic scheme but the reality proposes more 
complex situations with dozens of players involved.  
 Money laundering remains a hot topic in the FS sector, where it is almost five times more 
likely to occur than in other industries. The report of United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (World Bank and UNODC, 2011) estimates that criminal proceeds amounted to 3.6% 
of global GDP with up to 2,8 $ trillion being laundered. FS organizations fear the fallout of 
being caught up in money laundering – almost 30% believed that the most severe impact is 
reputational. The latest statistics available from Eurostat show that in 2010 266.388 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR)1, 118.559 Unusual Transaction Reports (UTR)2 and 
126.116 Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR)3.  
In the initial - or placement - stage of money laundering, the launderer introduces his illegal 
profits into the financial system. This might be done by breaking up large amounts of cash 
into less conspicuous smaller sums that are then deposited directly into a bank account, or by 
purchasing a series of monetary instruments (cheques, money orders, etc.) that are then 
collected and deposited into accounts at another location. 
It is also important to underline that all these frauds are strictly inter-connected since the illegal 
profits coming market abuses and tax frauds need to be “laundered” as well as the VAT carousel fraud 
is itself a form of money laundering. 
 
2 Current workflow for frauds detection and deficits 
2.1 Market abuse schemes 
If we refer to market abuse there are three broad groups of detection methods:  
 
 Simple detection procedure that deals with raw market data.  
 Procedures that utilize some statistical market models to forecast the market.  
 Non-parametric methods and numerical algorithms.  
 
                                                     
1 Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) is a disclosure made to an FIU by a professional having an obligation to disclose based on any 
suspicious activity of money laundering or terrorist financing. The main difference with STR is the fact that the SAR scope is broader as it 
may not include a transaction. 
2 Unusual transaction report (UTR) is a disclosure made to an FIU by a professional with an obligation to disclose, based on unusual 
behaviour in a client's profile. The main distinction between an STR and UTR is the higher standards and quality expected of STRs. 
3 Suspicious transaction report (STR) is a disclosure made to an FIU by a party having an obligation to disclose based on any type of 
suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing which are required by regulations, which may include unusual behaviour. Suspicious 
transactions are handled to the appropriate law enforcement units for investigation. The counting unit was specified as the initial STR 
received for each case opened by the FIU from each category of obliged entity. 
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The main disadvantages of these approaches are the need to constantly and precisely calibrate the 
algorithm parameters and a potential bias towards ambiguous signals of the system. Numerical 
algorithms need to be tested thoroughly before one can judge their effectiveness and put them into 
practice. Moreover these methods are based on the market data analysis without exploring the outer 
dimension coming from news, blogs, TV, radio and social channels.  
 
2.2 VAT Frauds and money laundering 
Feedback is an important technique in improving intelligence and maximising the impact of the effort 
that goes into reporting suspicious activity but large financial institutions can generate thousands (and 
in some cases, hundreds of thousands) of SARs every year, so AML compliance costs can be 
substantial.  Many scenarios will generate superfluous or unproductive alerts, that is, alerts where 
suspicious activity is anticipated but none is found. More unproductive alerts mean higher compliance 
costs.  Unstructured data can be a fundamental problem. In some instances, SAR databases are made 
up of many thousands of narrative reports containing unstructured data that can be difficult to analyse. 
Unstructured data is information presented as text – for example, a written paragraph describing the 
nature of the suspicious activity – which is challenging for analytics to parse. As of yet, there is no 
easy and reliable way to perform quantitative analysis on the informational components of a written 
paragraph. However, augmenting the SARs with descriptive (yet structured) information will help 
support the use of analytics and data mining tools.  
After having identified the illegal transaction the following action is to identify the Beneficial Owner 
and the actual Ownership Structure. The BOWNET project carried out a survey among the EU 
competent authorities asking what data/information is used to reconstruct the OS and identify the BO 
of suspicious corporate entities 
 
 
Figure 2. Data sources currently used for reconstructing the OS and identify the BO of 
suspicious corporate entities (source BOWNET project). 
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It is consequently not surprising to find that the data sources most frequently used in investigations of 
this kind are business registers, which usually provide, among other data, also information on the 
shareholders and directors of the legal persons registered. But if most SMEs, after all, are 
straightforward structures where the shareholders are the same as the directors and they hold the 
shares in their own names for some, particular those that want to obfuscate this information, there are 
many opportunities to do so these days – through nominee directors and shareholders, offshore 
entities, and complex networks of obscure company structures the rules 
 
 
Figure 3. Financial links between VAT carousel and drugs street cash (Source FATF). 
For all these frauds becomes fundamental to identify the signals of a suspicious transaction and trace 
the connections that may lead to the Beneficial Owner (BO) i.e. the actual responsible of the criminal 
offense. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2012) defines Beneficial Owner as: “the natural 
person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a 
transaction is being conducted. It also includes those persons who exercise ultimate effective control 
over a legal person or arrangement”. 
Directive 2005/60/EC (Third AML Directive or 3AMLD), integrated by implementing measures 
(Directive 2006/70/EC, see below), which comprises the highest number of provisions regarding BO 
identification and the disclosure of information on BOs and Ownership Structure OS. The 3AMLD 
addressed gaps highlighted in previous scoping studies and impact assessments, such as Transcrime in 
2007 and Howell e Van Reenen in 2005, in particular referring to the lack of regulation requiring 
disclosure of full information on BOs. In fact, the directive, drawing on from previous FATF 
recommendations and adopting an intermediary-based approach, requires the following categories: 
credit institutions, financial institutions, auditors, external accountants and tax advisors, notaries, and 
other independent legal professionals, trust or company service providers and real estate agents. 
Identifying then the money flow after it enters the financial system is therefore crucial to identifying 
the associated money laundering, and Suspicious Transaction Reports  (STRs) play a crucial role in 
this task. Therefore, whistleblowing mechanisms appear to be more prevalent than before, however 
doubts remain over their effectiveness. Indeed, a recent survey of FTMT-GAFI among countries 
representatives only 2 (out of 7) EU respondents were able to say how many intelligence reports 
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concerning VAT carousel fraud were disseminated to other countries and 25% of respondents failed to 
conduct annual fraud risk assessments.  
 
3 Features for a new model of Financial Frauds Detection  
Technological innovation, combined with the increase in the number of trading venues, makes it 
necessary for the Financial Institutions to use an electronic detection and analysis system to identify 
suspicious transactions, Beneficial Owners and Ownerships Structures. This enables to trace certain 
types of frauds abuse in a targeted way. In the future, the anti-fraud detection will focus more on the 
statistical analysis of transactions, price movements and use the use of algorithms to conduct searches 
of reported transactions (data mining) on big data4 rather than use single reports (i.e. SAR) as a 
starting point of the analysis. Our system for Finance Frauds Detection (FFD) aims to provide a new 
generation of services to better support the identification of the financial frauds in the previously 
described areas. The system will offer the financial institutions support for the whole workflow from 
the discovery of suspect behaviours to the identification of the Beneficial Owner and the actual 
Ownership Structure. 
 
Functions  Parameters 
Selection of input channels   
from all over the world from public Web Sites e.g. from online 
newspapers or press agencies, Social Networks, TV channels, Tax 
databases, banking system databases, company registries. They could 
select the sources, which are most relevant for the target users, e.g. on 
the basis of received input, news agencies or Web access statistics. 
The end consumers can be located in the region but also at any place 
in the world and are interested in some specific domains 
In:  
 list of Channels with Type 
  
Details related to channel type: 
 Web Sites: list of Pages  
social networks: topics, ... 
 TV Streams Time 
Schedule 
 company registries 
 market price time series 
 
Identification of stylized facts representing a signal of possible fraud, 
such as: 
  
 For market abuse 
o a trader places both buy and sell orders at about the 
same price 
o savvy online message board posters (a.k.a. "Bashers") 
who make up false and/or misleading information 
In:  
 stylized frauds, countries, 
sectors, persons, events 
time window 
 
                                                     
4 According to Gartner’s definition “Big data is high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets that demand 
cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decision making.” 
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about the target company in an attempt to get shares 
for a cheaper price 
o a group of traders create activity or rumours in order 
to drive the price of a security up 
o selling and repurchasing the same or substantially the 
same security for the purpose of generating activity 
and increasing the price. 
 
 
 For VAT and money laundering 
o Business has changed commodities and sectors 
quickly.  
o Turnover of business grows substantially in short time 
period  
o Unsolicited approaches from organisations with little 
history in the market offering a guaranteed profit on 
high-value deals.  
o Repeat deals at the same or a lower prices and small 
or consistent profit, e.g. €1 per item.  
o Instructions to pay less than the full price to the 
supplier.  
o Using goods that are of high value and low volume 
and attract a high tax rate such as computer parts or 
mobile phones.  
o The total amount of money channelled through an 
account is considerable, although the balance is 
usually very low.  
o Not publishing the companies’ annual records, 
pursuing activities that are not part of the corporate 
goals.  
o Obligatory elements of invoices, such as VAT 
number, date etc. are missing.  
o Foreign nationals in charge of companies, who have 
often never been a director of a company in the 
jurisdiction and may not have an address in the 
jurisdiction.  
o Invoices for services not usually associated with the 
business.  
o Export of goods do not match normal market rate. 
 order [relevance, topic, 
country, sector ...] 
 
Out:  
 alert on  potential frauds  
 Beneficial Owners  
 Ownership Structure 
 network of 
persons/companies 
 tendency:  %  growing / 
falling 
 Zooming in / out for 
Region 
 Zooming in / out for time 
windows 
  
The methods and tools applied 
are:  
 Cross lingual data 
extraction 
 Multi lingual semantic for 
identification of potential 
frauds 
 Supervised/knowledge 
based machine learning 
 Network analysis 
 Visualisation techniques 
 
Visualization   
to get an overview over most important new trends during the last 
hours or day or highlight specific developments. Users in charge of the 
control will utilize the visualization of transactions, BOs and OS from 
the observed channels to update and adopt the needed actions 
including the association of the sentiment to markets behavior and the  
face recognition of the suspects. 
In:  
 topics, countries, persons, 
 time window 
 type of visualization 
[diagram, 
      curbe, table…] 
Out: visualization figures  
Bellini F. / Big Data Analytics for Financial Frauds Detection 
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variable formats 
Exposé generation   
to get an ad hoc and intraday report:  users can select domains where 
they want to get information from in order to collect input materials 
for their own control activity. In-depth list of potential threats  which 
have to be updated several times per day. Include new sources that 
comply with the flexibly ordered digest of different new topics and 
support the FFD.  
In: topics, countries, sectors, 
persons 
   
 level of detail 
 time window 
 type of materials 
Out: links to background materials 
 type of material 
 links to big data sources, 
aggregated items 
   relevance values 
Table 1. Functions and Parameters of the Financial Frauds Detection system. 
Input Channels 
Input channels are social media (from Twitter to specialized blogs through Facebook), news channels 
(text and voice), financial information providers, information gathered by State bodies such as 
business registers, tax offices and made available under the Open Data scheme. Indeed, there is 
growing trend to make available to a wider public the information because it is essential to give the 
greatest publicity to the affairs of companies, which everyone may know on what grounds he is 
dealing5. These sources use text, pictures and video in the several languages that are used for business 
conversations for finance and trading:  
Internet, blogs, social media:  
 non-structured sources from Facebook, Twitter. 
 Business registers (Open Data)  
 Tax databases 
 Banking system databases 
 News providers 
 Financial information providers 
 
Output 
Analysis results for FFD system will be shown through a dashboard, which content can be exported to 
file reports in PDF format for in-house use. Different aggregates of the information shown in the 
                                                     
5 http://registries.opencorporates.com/ 
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dashboard could be exported including entities (company names, frauds, locations etc) mentions, 
trends related to a given entities and/or concepts appearing along with selected entities. 
The output of the FFD services will be delivered according the selected time windows and can be 
transferred in-house to another department or forwarded to external customers: 
 Reports according the selected topic, sector, companies and individuals 
 Visualizations according the defined parameters and scales 
 Links to original sources and background material. 
 
4 Conclusions 
We believe that the proposed approach goes beyond the current state of the art (Ngai et al., 2011) by 
applying monitoring of social networks, registers and web sources to extract cases of Market abuse, 
VAT frauds and Money laundering.  Indeed the control chain of Financial Frauds can be only 
reconstructed by merging the heterogeneous information from the business registers and other private 
business information providers, and by collecting information from open sources such as LEA reports, 
the press, social networks. 
The electronic detection and analysis to identify suspicious transactions, Beneficial Owners and 
Ownerships Structures is not widely exploited to trace certain types of frauds abuse in a targeted way. 
There is a potential for an anti-fraud detection which focus more on the statistical analysis of 
transactions, price movements and use the use of algorithms to conduct searches of reported 
transactions (data mining) on big data rather than use single reports (i.e. SAR) as a starting point of the 
analysis. The minor role played by open sources (e.g. news, press archives) is mostly due to problems 
of reliability and organisation of the information but also to the fact that almost half of the 
respondents (46.7%) did not make use of software (Transcrime, 2013) and IT tools to analyse such 
information.  
Here comes the role of our FFD system, indeed, if the non-use of software may not necessarily have 
consequences in terms of either the effectiveness of investigations or of their outcomes, it surely 
implies more time-consuming research or a loss of potential investigative leads. But at the present 
stage the business intelligence solutions are only used by a small number of public investigators in 
fraud identification activities due mainly to a lack of software able to collect, merge and process 
information coming from different sources different from business registers.  
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